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Democracy and the welfare state are two of the most extensively studied concepts and themes in 
the field of comparative politics. Debate about how to best measure the two concepts has failed 
to contemplate the extent to which political and social rights are uniformly present across distinct 
regions of the national territory, despite the presence of substantial subnational research that 
underscores wide variation inside countries. We argue that this omission hampers our 
understanding of the two phenomena and we propose a new measure of democracy and 
healthcare universalism, which we call the Adjusted Measures of Democracy and Welfare 
Universalism. The new measures integrate territorial inequality into existing national-level 
indicators, providing a more accurate picture of country performance and opening the door to 
new, multi-level theory building. 
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Democracy and the welfare state are two of the most extensively-studied concepts and 
themes in the field of comparative politics. Accordingly, scholars have engaged in lengthy debates 
about how to best measure the two phenomena, producing a rich and nuanced understanding of 
what constitutes a democratic regime and a universal welfare state, and about how scholars can 
empirically identify the presence or absence of the concepts in a given country. These debates have 
largely focused on delineating the core attributes of each concept, identifying national-level 
measures that provide a sense of the extent to which a country has free and fair elections, is able 
to freely express opinions, and can actively engage in civic life (for democracy); and the extent to 
which education, health, and a minimum income are provided as a guaranteed right of citizenship 
(in the case of universalistic welfare states).  
Interestingly, however, debate about these measures has failed to contemplate the extent to 
which these characteristics are uniformly present across distinct regions of the national territory. 
This is surprising because a growing body of subnational research (SNR) has uncovered wide 
variation inside countries in the provision of political and social rights. Studies on subnational 
democracy and subnational welfare provision have shown that countries around the world exhibit 
territorial variation in strength/presence of democracy and in the coverage/quality of social welfare 
policies.1  
In this article, we argue that the lack of a territorial component in concepts and measures 
of democracy and welfare state universalism hampers our understanding of these phenomena. It 
does so for at least three reasons. First, from a conceptual point of view, full democracy and welfare 
state universalism both implicitly rest on the idea that all citizens, regardless of where they reside 
within a given country, will have the opportunity to fully exercise their political and social rights. 
In other words, a full democracy and an universal welfare state exist only when all citizens from 
all parts of the territory can vote, engage in civic activities, express freely their thoughts, have 
access to health care and education, as well as other forms of social protection. The fact that the 
territorial distribution of political and social rights is implicitly assumed to be a core element of 
the concepts of democracy and welfare universalism, but that it has not yet been explicitly 
                                                     
1 For studies on subnational democracy see: Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and Hindley (1999), Fox (1994), Gibson (2005b), 
Hagopian (1994),  McMann (2006), O’Donnell (1993), Snyder (2001), Solt (2003), Benton (2012) Borges (2007), 
Gervasoni (2010b), Gervasoni (2010a), Giraudy (2010), Giraudy (2013), Giraudy (2015), Lankina and Getachew 
(2006), Lankina and Getachew (2012), Rebolledo (2011), and Reisinger and Moraski (2010). For studies on 
subnational social policy, see: Niedzwiecki (2018), Singh (2011), Singh (2015), Alves (2015), Tillin, Deshpande, and 
Kailash (2016), and Otero-Bahamon (2017). 
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incorporated into national-level measures, points to a serious mismatch between the definition of 
the concept and how it is operationalized, or to what Goertz (2006) has defined, as lacking concept-
measure consistency. We contend that this shortcoming requires that we revise existing measures 
to better match the underlying concept.  
Second, from an empirical point of view, existing national-level measures of democracy 
and welfare state universalism, which do not account for territorial dispersion, may be misleading, 
as they only provide partial information for diagnosing whether countries are fully democratic or 
universalistic in the provision of welfare benefits. As such, existing measures hamper scholars’ 
ability to empirically identify which cases have achieved full democracy and welfare state 
universalism, limiting us, in turn, from making accurate assessments about country performance.  
Third, measures of democracy and welfare state universalism that lack a territorial 
dimension may limit our theory development, inhibiting us from identifying the ways that multi-
level political interactions influence democracy and welfare state universalism. By contrast, a 
measure that captures territorial inequality of the prevalence of political and social rights may 
expose multi-level dynamics that were previously hidden, thereby encouraging scholars to rethink 
existing theories of democracy and welfare universalism.   
In this article we seek to remedy these three shortcomings by revising and rethinking the 
way we conceptualize and measure national-level democracy and welfare state universalism. We 
focus on the two concepts together because both have been extensively studied from a subnational 
perspective with research uncovering notable territorial variation inside countries. Perhaps more 
importantly, unlike other concepts, both implicitly rest on assumptions of territorial uniformity in 
the provision of political and social rights, but existing national measures have failed to incorporate 
subnational dispersion. We propose a Territorial Gini Index and use it to adjust our national-level 
measures of democracy and welfare state universalism, creating a new measure, i.e., the Adjusted 
Measures of Democracy/Welfare State Universalism for a subset of Latin American countries. 
These new measures reveal that incorporating a territorial dimension into existing national-level 
concepts and measures alter our understanding of country performance. As importantly, the new 
measures reveal that some countries that have thus far been celebrated for advancement toward 
greater democracy and welfare universalism, appear less impressive when territorial variation is 
factored in. In the case of welfare state universalism, Chile’s performance declines markedly after 
adjusting for territorial inequality, while Mexico and Peru perform even worse. By contrast, 
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Argentina changes very little. In the case of democracy, Argentina and Mexico perform less well 
than national level measures on democracy indicate, and even more surprisingly, the new adjusted 
measure of democracy reveals that in the 1990s, Mexico, contrary to conventional wisdom, has 
performed better than Argentina.  
At a theoretical level, as discussed in Section III, the incorporation of a territorial 
dimension to existing concepts and measures also prompts us to revisit existing theories of 
democracy and welfare universalism that have only focused on national level actors and factors. 
Instead, we argue, theories should be multilevel thereby incorporating both national and 
subnational factors. 
Before outlining the organization of the article, a caveat is in order. The predominant focus 
of this article is conceptual. We do not seek to explain cross-national variation, but instead our 
goal is to integrate a territorial dimension into existing measures of democracy and welfare state 
universalism and to explore how this new approach to measurement shifts our empirical 
understanding of a set of cases. We contend that this is needed and marks a first and important step 
toward integrating subnational and national research traditions on democracy and welfare state 
universalism.  
For the analysis of democracy, we focus on two cases: Argentina and Mexico. In the case 
of welfare state universalism, we add two additional countries: Chile and Peru. The decision to 
focus on these four countries in the case of healthcare universalism is because they allow us to 
assess the validity and implications of the adjusted measure in both federal countries (Argentina 
and Mexico) and unitary states (Chile and Peru). During the 1980s and early ‘90s, the provision 
of public health and education services was decentralized to regional and municipal governments 
in many Latin American countries, even in unitary states like Chile and Peru. As a result, even in 
these two countries, territorial unevenness in the provision of social rights increased. For the 
analysis of democracy, by contrast, we focus exclusively on two federal cases. This is because in 
federal countries, subnational units have, by definition, the prerogative to autonomously create and 
change the rules that structure political regimes. As a result, electoral rules and institutions, as well 
as the political and civil rights enshrined in the provincial constitutions are likely to vary across 
territorial units, thus increasing territorial unevenness within countries. The same is not true in 
unitary states. 
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The article is organized into four parts. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of 
the literature on national-level democracy and welfare state universalism, describing existing 
concepts and measures. We also briefly summarize some of the primary findings from the 
subnational literature. In the second part of the article, we present data on democracy and 
healthcare universalism at both the national and subnational level for a subset of Latin American 
countries. We then calculate the Territorial Gini Index and incorporate it to traditional measures 
of democracy and welfare state universalism to create the Adjusted Measures of 
Democracy/Welfare State Universalism. The analysis presents a discussion of our proposed 
measure, highlighting how it changes our perception of country performance. The third section 
reflects on how the Adjusted Measures of Democracy/Welfare Universalism can spur multilevel 
theorization. We conclude with a discussion of the shortcomings of our new measures, and an 
overview of the article’s significance. 
 
Democracy and Welfare State Universalism: Concepts and Measures  
The “Third Wave” of democratization that swept the globe during the past 40 years 
(Huntington 1993) did not spread evenly inside countries. As scholars of newly-democratic 
countries ranging from Mexico to Russia, the Philippines, Argentina, and Brazil found, non-
democratic regimes not only persisted at the subnational level, but were not isolated “backwaters” 
disconnected from the newly democratic national political arena (Cornelius, Eisenstadt, and 
Hindley 1999, Fox 1994, Hagopian 1994, McMann 2006, O’Donnell 1993, Snyder 2001, Solt 
2003). Instead they became important sources of votes and other forms of political support for 
national political elites. According to experts, these subnational undemocratic regimes (SURs) 
have been resilient because of a number of factors, including, among others, the exclusionary 
practices of elites, such as the distortion of local electoral rules and procedures (Benton 2012, 
Behrend and Whitehead 2016, Calvo and Micozzi 2005), the stacking of electoral commissions 
with political allies (Rebolledo 2011), the politicization of local judiciaries (Brinks 2007, 
Castagnola 2012, Chavez 2004, Leiras 2015), and the perpetration of extra-legal violence against 
opposition (Gibson 2005a).  Other studies have demonstrated that economic factors explain the 
emergence and durability of subnational authoritarianism, including local political economies 
(McMann 2006, Behrend 2011, Hale 2003), inter-governmental fiscal transfers (Gervasoni 2010b, 
Diaz-Rioseco 2016), and subnational undemocratic regimes insertion into global markets (Libman 
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and Obydenkova 2014). Still other studies offered multilevel theoretical frameworks that center 
on strategic interactions between local and national political actors to account for both the 
endurance and breakdown of subnational authoritarian regimes (Gibson 2005a, 2013, Giraudy 
2013, 2015, Reuter and Robertson 2015).    
 Despite these important findings on the territorial uneven nature of democratic regimes, 
most definitions and measures of national democracy are not sensitive to this territorial variation. 
None of the traditional measures of democracy, i.e., Polity IV, Freedom House, V-Dem Project, 
have factored in territorial variation in their national-level measures2. As a result, these measures 
are not able to gauge whether political rights are distributed uniformly across the territory, thus 
failing to capture one of the core assumptions of democracy, namely, that all citizens ought to have 
equal political rights no matter where they live.  
A similar trend exists in research on the welfare state. Analyses of Latin American, Indian, 
and Chinese welfare states from a subnational perspective have mostly focused on documenting 
and explaining territorial variation in the implementation of social policies. Some of these studies 
reveal that even in contexts of relatively universalistic legislation at the national level, such as 
those seen in some Latin American countries, the coverage, quality, and enforcement of social 
services and income transfers often varies across territorial units (Niedzwiecki 2018, Alves 2015, 
Chapman Osterkatz 2013, Otero-Bahamon 2017). Moreover, this research shows that theories that 
explain cross-national differences in social policy formation and change are often ineffective at 
explaining subnational variation. Similar findings exist for countries outside of Latin America, 
including India (Tillin, Deshpande, and Kailash 2016, Singh 2015) and China (Ratigan 2017).  
Despite the growing volume of research documenting subnational variation in social policy 
implementation, scholars of cross-national politics pay little attention to whether or not access to 
services and transfers is uniform across different regions/state/provinces. Similarly, assessments 
of service quality/benefit generosity do not probe whether services and transfers are uniform across 
the territory. Finally, the analysis of whether eligibility criteria are transparently enforced has also 
been approached exclusively from a national-level perspective, turning a blind eye to the fact that 
state capacity and strength may vary across subnational units, thereby generating unevenness in 
the enforcement of rules. All of this suggests that a new and more comprehensive measure of 
                                                     
2 An exception is the V-Dem project, which has a component of territorial variation, yet this component is not added 
to national level democracy measures. 
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universalism is needed. Such a measure must incorporate territorial inequality to fully assess to 
what extent social rights are provided to all citizens, regardless of their place of residence, in a 
uniform manner. In the next section we take upon this task. 
 
Incorporating Territorial Dispersion into National-level Concepts and Measurement 
 
 In this section, we present traditional measures of democracy and state welfare 
universalism. We then create the Territorial Inequality Gini Index and calculate the Adjusted 
Measures of Democracy/Welfare State Universalism for each research program. The Territorial 
Gini Index is a measure of dispersion that calculates how far a distribution of values deviates from 
one of perfect equality (0). The Gini Index can be calculated for individuals or groups and our 
measures provide insight into dispersion in subnational democracy and healthcare coverage.  
We use the Gini Index to adjust national-level measures of democracy and healthcare 
universalism because we find it to be the most transparent option, despite its drawbacks. Moreover, 
its use is well established in the literature (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, Hicks 1997), The Gini 
Index is a measure of inequality that gauges dispersion rather than gap. Gap measures of inequality 
focus on the distance between the tails of a given distribution. Dispersion measures, by contrast, 
capture the distance from a perfect distribution. In the context of this article, this means that if a 
country has uniform subnational performance (even if that performance is poor), it would have a 
low Gini Index, and therefore, the adjusted measure would vary only minimally from the original 
(national) rate. Otero-Bahamon (2017) and others note that measures of dispersion, like the Gini 
Coefficient, can be misleading because they neglect the issue of levels, focusing instead on the 
relative position of each unit vis a vis the other. The author argues that a better approach is to 
combine a measure of dispersion and a measure of gap, thus giving a sense of both the distance 
between the extremes of the distribution, but also whether those extremes represent the broader 
range of values across cases. Specifically, Otero-Bahamon (2017) proposes a new measure of 
subnational inequality, operationalized as the product of gap and the coefficient of variation. The 
measure cannot be used for the purpose of our article because it is not bounded. The Gini Index, 
by contrast, is bounded by 0 and 1, thereby increasing the transparency of our adjustment. Because 
of this, and since this particular group of cases do not have widely divergent gaps, we believe that 
relying on the Gini Index to adjust our national indicators makes good sense. Moreover, if a given 
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country has uniformly poor (or strong) performance, its national-level indicators of democracy and 
universalism will reflect this fact, thereby eliminating concerns that use of the Gini may keep us 
from effectively capturing cross-national variation.  
Another advantage of the Gini is that it is widely used and scholars are familiar with its 
calculation. The Gini measures distance from a perfect distribution. In the case of this paper, a 
country might have a perfect distribution of subnational democracy if all provinces/regions were 
equally democratic or equally undemocratic. Similarly, it could have a perfect distribution of 
vaccine coverage if all provinces/regions had 100 percent coverage or similarly low coverage. 
When countries vary from that perfect distribution, the Gini grows in value. In this paper, we 
calculate inequality between distinct provinces/regions, drawing on regional indicators of 
subnational democracy and coverage of the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (MMR). We 
then use STATA and the ‘fastgini’ command to calculate the territorial Gini Index.3  
A final advantage of the Gini is that other scholars  interested in adjusting national-level 
measures for territorial unevenness have also used the Gini Index. Hicks (1997), for example, 
analyzes the UNDP’s Human Development index, noting that the aggregate index can be 
misleading for countries characterized by high levels of inequality. He contends that analyzing a 
country’s average life expectancy may mask notable variation between different ethnic/racial 
groups, rural or urban status, gender, or class/caste. To address this shortcoming, the author 
proposes an inequality-adjusted HDI, which he calculates by adjusting aggregate values of gross 
national income, literacy, and average life expectancy by the Gini Index of inequality for each of 
these dimensions. The work builds upon Sen (1976) and Klasen (1994), who use a similar 
approach. In a separate project, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) build a measure of party 
nationalization drawing on a Gini Index that measures the extent to which a party wins equal vote 
shares across all the sub-national units. A Gini coefficient of 0 signifies that a party received the 
same share of the vote in every sub-national unit. A Gini coefficient of 1 means that it received 
100 percent of its vote in one subnational unit and 0 percent in all the rest. The authors then subtract 
that Gini coefficient from 1 so that a high score indicates a high level of nationalization. They call 
this inverted Gini coefficient the Party Nationalization Score (PNS). We build upon the work of 
                                                     
3 The “fastgini” calculates the Gini coefficient for either unit-level or aggregated level data. Optionally it returns the 
jackknife estimates of  the standard error. Fastgini uses a fast optimized algorithm that could be especially useful when 
calculating the Gini coefficient and its standard errors for the large samples. The command implements algorithms for 
both exact and approximate calculation of the Gini coefficient.  
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these scholars, using an inverted Territorial Gini Index to adjust our national-level indicators of 
healthcare universalism and democracy. Extending Hicks (1997) and Jones and Mainwaring 
(2003), we use the following equation: 
 
Adjusted Measure = [(National Measure) * (1-(Territorial Gini Index))] 
 
We opt for this equation because slight iterations of it have been used by Klasen (1994), 
Sen (1976), and Hicks (1997). Importantly, the equation allows for a country’s inequality-adjusted 
rate to remain unchanged if it exhibits no territorial inequality because one minus zero is equal to 
one. If, however, the country exhibits high rates of regional inequality, the national rate, will be 
adjusted downward. For example, if a country had a Gini Index of .8, then the final value for the 
national indicator would be only two-tenths of the original value. The drawback, therefore, is that 
the adjusted rate can decline dramatically in settings of high subnational inequality. We contend 
that this is appropriate because, wide dispersion in democratic integrity and access to basic 
healthcare services constitutes a violation of the underlying concepts of democracy and 
universalism.  
It is instructive to consider two concrete examples of how we carried out this adjustment. 
The national level measure of electoral democracy in Argentina in 2000 was 0.87. The Gini Index 
of territorial inequality in electoral democracy for that same year was low: .3. We multiplied .87 
by .7 to obtain the adjusted value of 0.610. For the case of healthcare universalism, we do the 
same. The national coverage of the MMR vaccine in Argentina in 2012 was 93.6 percent. The Gini 
Index of territorial inequality in vaccine coverage for that same year was low: .044. We, therefore, 
multiple 93.6 by .956 to arrive at the adjusted value of 89.48 percent coverage.  
We calculate the Territorial Gini Index and the Adjusted Measure across Argentina’s 24 
provinces and Mexico’s 32 states for the case of democracy, and across Argentina’s 24 provinces, 
Mexico’s 32 states, Chile’s 15 regions, and Peru’s 25 departments for the case of healthcare 
coverage. The reason we add Chile and Peru to the analysis of healthcare universalism is because 
after healthcare was decentralized, subnational units in both states became responsible for the 
administration of some public healthcare services. We focus our analysis on the MMR vaccine 
because it is required by all four countries’ national immunization programs and it has been 
administered for a long time. The vaccination is generally given around the age of 1 year. Due to 
 
 
10 
 
data limitations, we are unable to analyze vaccine coverage across time,4 but we do present cross-
temporal data for the adjusted measure of democracy.    
Democracy 
For our analysis of democracy we draw on the V-Dem national electoral democracy 
measure and on Giraudy’s (2015) measures of SURs to create a new, adjusted measure of country 
democracy. Both measures capture the electoral dimension of democracy, namely, the 
competitiveness of the political system, and the existence (or lack thereof) of electoral fraud, which 
is typically considered as a “minimalist” conceptualization of democracy. Specifically, we employ 
V-dem’s electoral component index, which addresses the question “to what extent is the electoral 
principle of democracy achieved?”  Electoral democracy is presumed to be achieved when 
“suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are 
clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is 
selected (directly or indirectly) through elections” (V-Dem Codebook v6, 2016, page 51). The 
variable is an index measure which combines measures of these four features (suffrage, freedom 
of association, clean elections, and elected executive).   
Giraudy’s (2015) SUR index also taps onto the electoral dimension of subnational 
democracy. This measure combines three features of the electoral process: whether elections are 
contested and clean, and the competitiveness of the political system (i.e., whether the opposition 
has actual possibilities to access office (alternation).5 The data used for this new adjusted measure 
spans the 1997-2009 period in Mexico, and 1983-2009 period in Argentina. As noted above, data 
is available for all 24 provinces in Argentina, and Mexico’s 32 states.6 
Figure 1 presents the national V-Dem electoral democracy measure for Argentina and 
Mexico. The figure reveals that, according to traditional national-level measures of democracy, 
Argentina’s democratic performance is consistently higher than Mexico’s by a 0.19 point average. 
 
                                                     
4 Provincial vaccine coverage in Argentina is only available for one time point. 
5Unlike the V-Dem index, the SUR index does not have a component on universal suffrage. This component is not 
needed as subnational political regimes that are embedded in a national democratic system, such as the two country 
cases analyzed here, guarantee citizens minimal electoral rights, such as universal suffrage.   
6 Time intervals in each country start with the most recent transition to democracy at the national level, as these 
transitions paved the way for “regime juxtaposition,” (Gibson 2005a). The onset of democratization in Argentina is 
set in 1983, when military rule was replaced by a democratically-elected civilian government. In Mexico, it is set in 
1997 since, according to prominent Mexican scholars, this year marked the onset of democratization in the country at 
the federal level (see, for instance, Magaloni 2005). In 1997, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its 
majority in the lower chamber of Congress, and consequently its hegemony in the legislative arena. Time intervals in 
each country end in 2009, when mid-term national elections were held. 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
The Territorial Gini Index of Democracy  
Figure 2 displays the Territorial Gini Index across time in Argentina and Mexico. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that even though these two countries rank relatively high on 
electoral democracy at the national level when compared to other countries in the developing 
world, democracy has not trickled down evenly across the territory (Giraudy 2010, 2013, 2015, 
Benton 2012, Rebolledo 2011, Gibson 2005a, Gervasoni 2010a, Behrend 2011). In fact, the 
analysis of the Territorial Gini Index shows that Argentina has higher territorial inequality than 
Mexico, and that this inequality evens out over time. Interestingly, when seen from a cross-
temporal point of view, both Argentina and Mexico show that democratic territorial inequality is 
not a static aspect of their respective political systems but that rather it can rise and decrease. 
Territorial inequality was lower at the onset of each country’s transition to democracy, and it 
slowly but steady went up within the first 10 years of democratization. In the case of Argentina, 
territorial inequality begins to decrease in the late  2000s.  
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The Adjusted Measure of Democracy 
As seen in Figures 3 and 4, when territorial variation is taken into account, the countries’ 
measures of democracy vary significantly. Argentina ranks significantly lower when the measure 
is adjusted, revealing that the country should not be regarded as democratic as it is typically 
considered to be. A comparison between the measures suggests that the gap between them is higher 
in the 1990s, when the difference between them is of 0.28 points. This gap begins to close in 2008, 
with a 0.17 point difference among measures. Starting in 2008, the difference between the 
measures resembles the gap observed the late 1980s. A similar trend of disparity between measures 
can be seen in Mexico. Yet, the gap in this country is considerably lower than in Argentina. 
Mexico’s difference never surpasses 0.14-point difference. In this case, both measures begin to 
look more attuned in 2004, with this difference being 0.12 points.  
 
[Figures 3 and 4 here] 
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As shown in Figure 5, and compared to the information displayed in Figure 1, the adjusted 
measure reveals that pattern of democratic evolution in Argentina and Mexico is more similar than 
when the measure does not weigh in a territorial dimension.  As shown in Figure 5, during the 
1990s and early 2000s, Argentina and Mexico exhibit similar levels of democracy, a smiliarity that 
is completely overlooked by a measure that does not factor in a territorial dimension. These results 
reveal that our assessment of democracy in these two countries is considerably different when 
alternate measures are employed.  We claim that the adjusted measure of democracy is better 
equipped to capture one of the core dimensions of democracy, i.e., that all ctizens have equal 
political rights, and as result offers a better characterization of how individual countries perform. 
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Healthcare universalism 
Welfare state universalism is a concept often associated with the advanced industrialized 
welfare states of Europe, but beginning in the early 2000s a group of scholars sought to adapt the 
term to the context of Latin America. Filgueira et al. (2006) were perhaps the first to build a Latin 
American conceptualization of universalism, focusing on what they called ‘basic universalism.’ 
Basic universalism refers to a system of social protection that guarantees coverage for all citizens 
for a group of essential services and transfers. The state plays a central role in providing benefits 
and ensuring that all citizens can effectively access and use services and transfers. Huber and 
Stephens (2012b), Pribble (2013), and Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez Ancochea (2016) adapt this 
concept to their analyses, defining social policies as universal if they cover the entire population; 
provide high-quality public services and generous transfers (with limited segmentation in benefit 
size); are granted on the basis of transparent criteria (i.e. as rights); and are financed in a sustainable 
and equitable manner.7   
Creating a new measure of welfare state universalism that both accounts for aggregate 
national performance and subnational variation is challenging because existing measures of the 
concept are qualitative, based on extensive coding schemes that cannot be replicated across 
multiple subnational units. For example, adapting Pribble’s (2013) coding of healthcare 
                                                     
7 All three sets of authors recognize that many Latin American states will not reach 100 percent coverage and establish 
thresholds to differentiate between pure, advanced, and moderate forms of universalism. 
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universalism would require that scholars carry out in-depth research about both public and private-
sector service quality in each and every province/state/region, as well as investigate whether 
eligibility criteria are enforced in legalistic and transparent ways in each state. Such a coding is 
possible for a handful of countries and a limited number of time points, but becomes less feasible 
for 15-25 provinces/states/regions across multiple countries.  
As a result, the first step toward re-conceptualizing welfare universalism requires that we 
identify a quantitative indicator that can be measured at both the national and subnational level 
and provides a sense of a social policy coverage, quality, and eligibility criteria. Such a measure 
is difficult to come by and will vary by policy sector. A complete approach, therefore, requires 
that we identify such indicators for each of the welfare state’s predominant policy sectors: 
education, healthcare, pensions, and family assistance. For the purpose of this article, however, we 
focus on only one dimension of the welfare state: healthcare.8  
One way to measure the coverage, quality, and transparent enforcement of public 
healthcare services quantitatively is with an indicator of access to care. Vaccine coverage is such 
a measure and provides insight into what share of the national and subnational population were 
able to effectively use a key health service: immunizations. Since vaccine coverage can be 
measured at both the national and the subnational level, the indicator is ideal. Moreover, because 
the measure probes actual use of healthcare services, it provides a direct assessment of all three 
dimensions of universalism. In settings where virtually all citizens are covered by healthcare 
services, vaccine rates, especially for immunizations that are included in a country’s public health 
recommendations, should be high.9 If service quality is uniform across the territory; that is to say 
that all regions/provinces have similar levels of infrastructure, health personnel, and clinic space, 
then everyone who is covered by the healthcare system should be able to obtain the immunization 
easily and coverage rates at the national and subnational level should vary minimally. Finally, if 
the implementation of health services is carried out in a legalistic and transparent way, free of 
                                                     
8 We choose to narrow the discussion to healthcare for several reasons. First, it is not realistic to build and analyze a 
new measure of overall welfare state universalism in an article-length manuscript. Thus, it is essential to narrow the 
scope and focus on one policy dimension. This approach has been taken by many scholars of comparative social 
policy, who argue that the politics of policy formation and reform often vary across sectors because of the presence 
of diverse stakeholders and distinct opportunity structures (Pribble 2013, Niedzwiecki 2018). Second, a focus on 
healthcare is especially appropriate for this article because the administration of health services has been decentralized 
to state and/or municipal governments in most Latin American countries. As a result, it is a policy domain that has 
been extensively researched from both the national and subnational perspective. It is also the policy sector that is 
likely to be heavily affected by territorial variation. 
9 For the four countries included in this analysis, we consider vaccines that are included in the national registry. 
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clientelism and favoritism, then vaccination rates, especially for required immunizations, should 
be uniformly high. We, therefore, use a country’s vaccination rate, focusing on the MMR 
immunization, to probe healthcare universalism at the national and subnational level in four Latin 
American countries.10 We contend that the selection of this vaccine is appropriate because it is 
included in the national vaccine schedule for the countries analyzed in the article and all four states 
have extensive experience providing the immunization. We compared these results to adjusted 
measures of vaccine coverage for Tuberculosis and the Diferia, tetnus, whooping cough vaccines 
and the results were similar.11  
Studies of healthcare access sometimes focus on infant mortality, maternal mortality, and 
the share of births attended by a skilled physician. While all three of these options provide insight 
into the degree of healthcare universalism, the first two are also affected by a range of other factors, 
including santitation, regime type, wealth, and women’s status in society (McGuire 2010a, Drèze 
and Sen 1989, Filmer and Pritchett 1999). For this reason, we do not adopt these two measures. 
(McGuire 2010a) and Niedzwiecki (2018) use the indicator births attended by a skilled technician 
to assess access to public health services. We agree that this measure probes healthcare access, but 
we argue that it is not appropriate for capturing territorial inequality in this particular set of 
countries. This is because, for example, births are handled by hospitals in Chile, but hospitals are 
not administered by subnational units. Instead, the national Health Ministry runs hopsitals through 
regional health directors that are appointed and respond to the central government. Vaccinations, 
by contrast, are distributed in Chile’s primary care clinics, which are administered by the country’s 
346 municipal governments. For this reason, we are less likely to pick up on territorial gaps in 
social rights if we focus on services provided by hospitals than those provided by local 
governments. While some hospitals are run by provincial governments in Argentina, the federal 
government also administers hospitals, thereby blurring the lines of responsibility. Similar 
divisions and overlap exist in Peru and Mexico. For this reason, we contend that immunization 
coverage, which in all four cases provides insight into local-level health services, is the best proxy 
to capture both healthcare universalism and territorial variation. 
                                                     
10 The data are taken from the following sources: Ministerio de Salud Républica de Peru (2017), Ministerio de Salud 
Républica de Chile (2017), Ministerio de Salud Presidencia de la Nación Argentina (2017), Subsecreatría de 
Prevención y Promoción de la Salud . 
11 Whereas there has been an increase in the share of families that rejecting vaccines in some income groups in the 
United States, this is less true in our selection of countries. Thus, declines in vaccine coverage are not likely to reflect 
personal preferences, but rather barriers to access.   
 
 
15 
 
Table 1 presents the national coverage rates for the MMR vaccine in Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico, and Peru, for the year 2012.12 The variable is measured as the share of the target 
population that received the vaccine during that year. The table reveals that, with the partial 
exception of Mexico, all four countries exhibit high rates of vaccine coverage at the national level. 
Indeed, in Argentina coverage of the MMR vaccine was 93.6 percent. In Chile, 90.6 percent of the 
target population was vaccinated for MMR, whereas in Mexico and Peru, coverage rates were 
88.67 and 92.9, respectively. The decision of whether or not these rates constitute “healthcare 
universalism” is complicated, but a look at advanced industrialized democracies suggests that the 
performance is very strong.  
[Table 1 here] 
 
As displayed in Table 2, immunization rates for the universalistic welfare states of 
Sweden and Finland varied between 95.4 and 97.5 percent for MMR vaccine. This suggests that 
immunization coverage above 90 percent can safely be considered ‘universalistic.’ Using this 
cut-off, we can conclude that Argentina, Chile, and Peru have achieved healthcare universalism 
when viewed from the national-level. By contrast, Mexico might be considered moderately 
universal. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The Territorial Gini Index of Healthcare Universalism 
Table 1 presents the Territorial Gini Index of inequality in vaccine coverage in Argentina, 
Chile, Peru, and Uruguay. It shows that territorial inequality in healthcare provision is highest in 
Peru (.097), followed by Mexico (.076), Chile (.057), and finally Argentina (.044). The table 
reveals that when viewed from the subnational level and through a lens of territorial inequality,  
Chile, Mexico, Peru, and to a lesser extent Argentina, exhibit notable subnational variation with 
regard to access to vaccines. This suggests that the coverage, quality, and eligibility rule 
enforcement in each country’s health system is not uniform across provinces/regions/departments, 
thereby undermining universalism. Put differently, it appears that the universalistic progress made 
at the national level in these four countries has not filtered down equally to all citizens. While 
some residents enjoy universal access, others encounter barriers to accessing basic healthcare 
                                                     
12 Argentine data is only available for the year 2013. The closest available year for the other three cases is 2012. 
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services. All of this suggests that our national-level indicators need to be adjusted for subnational 
unevenness. 
The Adjusted Measure of Healthcare Universalism 
Table 1 presents our adjusted measure of vaccine coverage.  The coverage of the MMR 
vaccine falls from 93.6 percent to 89.48 percent in Argentina. The decline is more severe in Chile 
and Peru, where the rates decline from 90.6 to 85.4 and 92.9 to 83.9 percent, respectively. In 
Mexico the coverage rate falls from 88.67 to 81.9 percent. A similar story is true for the 
Tuberculosis and Diferia, Tetnus, and Whooping Cough vaccines.13  
We contend that the adjusted rates of vaccine coverage provide a more accurate empirical 
account of the extent to which a country’s healthcare system is universal. Drawing on the evidence 
presented in Table 1, we can see that whereas Argentina maintains the label of universalism by 
holding coverage at 90 percent or higher, Chile, Mexico, and Peru slip into only a moderately 
universal terrain (80-89.9 percent). This is interesting, as it forces us to re-think a common finding 
in the comparative social policy literature, namely that Chile is one of the Latin American countries 
that has moved the furthers progress toward welfare state universalism since the 1990 transition to 
democracy (Pribble 2013, Huber and Stephens 2012b).  
 
Chile’s progress on the social policy front has been noted by several scholars. Huber and 
Stephens (2012) classify Chile as one of Latin America’s advanced welfare states. Similarly, 
Pribble (2013) finds that Chile was able to reform both health and pension systems in the direction 
of greater universalism, achieving ‘advanced universalism’ in both policy sectors. Specifically, the 
author finds that the 2004 AUGE healthcare reform, which guaranteed coverage for a set of 40 
illnesses, increased health universalism by improving coverage, decreasing the quality gap 
between the public and private sector, and creating transparent mechanisms for holding providers 
accountable for meeting treatment protocols.14 The analysis, however, fails to consider whether 
the reform was implemented evenly across the territory or whether regional differences in the 
scope of health infrastructure allow for AUGE to work outside of Santiago. The data presented in 
Table 1 suggest that the reform failed to remedy subnational inequalities. In this way, the new 
                                                     
13 Due to data limitations, we were not able to check the results for Mexico. 
14 The AUGE reform was eventually renamed (AUGE-GES) and expanded to cover 80 illnesses. 
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measure of healthcare universalism, both exposes new empirical information about country 
performance and pushes us to incorporate multi-level dynamics into our existing theories.  
 
Adjusted Measures and Multilevel Theory Building 
The Adjusted Measures we present above call into question existing measures and country 
classifications of national-level democracy and welfare universalism but they also force us rethink 
existing theories about the origins, change, and decay of national democracy and welfare 
universalism. We argue that the incorporation of a territorial dimension to these measures exposes 
previously un-noticed multi-level dynamics that must be incorporated into our theories.  
Multilevel theories have a long pedigree in the field of International Relations (Evans et al. 
1993; Gourevitch 1978; Singer 1961) and, as Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder (forthcoming) note, 
because of the recent proliferation of SNR, they are now increasingly common in comparative 
politics (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2016). These theories essentially capture the effects that factors 
operating at lower levels of government have on international or national level outcomes.15 From 
this standpoint, national outcomes cannot be properly understood without paying attention to 
subnational institutions, actors, and events.  Indeed, scholars attuned to multi-level theories show 
how the neglect to subnational variables results, at best, in incomplete explanations and, at worst, 
in fundamental misunderstandings of national-level outcomes.  
Research on subnational democracy in Latin America provides insights into how national-
level democratic consolidation can be achieved. Theories of democratic consolidation rarely pay 
attention to the politics that unfold beyond the central state. Most of them focus on the national 
elites, the working and or middle classes, international pressures, and/or economic variables 
(Barrington Moore 1966, Rueschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992, Boix 2003, Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012). Yet, research on subnational democracy shows that obstacles to full 
democratization can also stem from the political clashes among actors situated in different levels 
of government.  
Gibson (2013) and Giraudy (2015) show that clashes between presidents and governments 
in Mexico and Argentina, have prevented democracy from trickling down evenly throughout the 
                                                     
15 Giraudy, Moncada, and Snyder (forthcoming) note that there are two types of multi-level theories: (a) bottom-up 
theories where subnational variables explain national-level outcomes and (b) top-down theories, where, conversely, 
national-level variables explain subnational outcomes. In this article we focus on (a). 
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territory. Democratically elected presidents who aspire to build winning electoral and legislative 
coalitions at the national level might likely require the political support of subnational autocrats. 
With their tight control over local party machines, as well as their capacity to prevent opposition 
forces from winning over voters, autocrats from SURs can help deliver votes that have a decisive 
impact on general and mid-term national elections (Snyder 1999; Gibson 2005; Tudor and Ziegfeld 
forthcoming). Subnational autocrats can also become attractive coalitional partners due to their 
capacity to deliver electoral support by engaging in “turnout buying” (Nichter 2008). Furthermore, 
autocrats’ capacity to control local and federal legislators’ political careers turns them into valuable 
coalitional partners, as they have considerable leeway to influence and discipline legislators’ 
voting behavior, and thus secure congressional support for the passage of bills that are central to 
national incumbents’ political projects (De Luca et al. 2002; Gordin 2004; Jones and Hwang 2005; 
Samuels 2003; Díaz-Cayeros 2006; Langston 2004, 2005; Langston and Aparicio 2008; Rebolledo 
2011).  
Democratic presidents, as Giraudy (2015) shows, who can exercise effective power over 
subnational autocrats have high incentives to contribute to the reproduction of peripheral 
undemocratic regimes, and in so doing prevent democracy from trickling down evenly throughout 
the territory, thus undermining full democratization. This type of multilevel theory provides and 
alternative account to democratic consolidation in Argentina and Mexico. In these countries the 
incapacity to achieve full democratization might have to do more with multilevel dynamics rather 
than with the strength of the working and middle classes, clashes among social classes, and/or with 
international influences.  
To date, most studies of cross-national variation in social policy expansion and reform have 
focused exclusively on national-level variables, paying careful attention to political institutional 
design, electoral competition, political party character, and the distribution of power.16 Only 
recently have scholars begun to consider how multi-level dynamics may also shape differences 
across countries. For example, Otero-Bahamon (2017) demonstrates that the relative power of 
subnational elites vis a vis national technocrats in Colombia and Peru explains cross-national 
variation in territorial inequality in human development. Relatedly, Pribble (2017) finds that 
                                                     
16 Some examples of this research in the Latin American context include: (Huber and Stephens 2012a, Pribble 2013, 
Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez Ancochea 2016, Castiglioni 2005, Dion 2010, Brooks 2009, McGuire 2010b, Haggard 
and Kaufman 2009, Garay 2016) 
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variation in the quality and coverage of healthcare services in Chile is explained by multi-level 
political dynamics that emerged during the foundation of the national health system. Specifically, 
choices made by national elites about where to focus investment and infrastructure development, 
and the response from subnational elites and organized groups, established a pattern of 
development that continues to shape healthcare service delivery to this day.  
In both of these last two examples, as well as in studies of democracy mentioned above, 
scholars are able to identify multi-level dynamics and develop multi-level theories because they 
adopt measures of universalism and democracy that had an explicit territorial dynamic. In so doing, 
these scholars provide new, alternative theories of democracy and welfare universalism, and in 
some cases challenged extant, well-established and popular explanations in these two themes in 
comparative politics.  
 
Conclusion 
SNR has made important contributions in two prominent research areas in comparative 
politics: democracy and welfare states, demonstrating that democracy and welfare provision have 
not trickled down evenly within countries. Despite these contributions, cross-national researchers 
in these two areas have not incorporated this territorial variation into existing concepts and 
measures. This article makes the case that this omission has impaired our proper understanding of 
democracy and welfare provision. More specifically, the article contends that existing national-
level measures of democracy and welfare universalism lack precision, and may lead to unbiased 
assessments because they do not weigh within-country territorial variation.  
The goal of this article has been to show empirically that incorporating territorial has 
important empirical implications for how we identify and think about democracy and welfare 
universalism. In this article we propose a Territorial Gini Index and incorporate it to existing 
national-level measures of democracy and welfare state universalism, creating a new measure, i.e., 
the Adjusted Measures of Democracy/Welfare State Universalism. Drawing on evidence from a 
subset of Latin American countries, we find that adjusted measures provide a different, more 
realistic picture of the performance of democracy and welfare universalism. The findings of this 
article suggest that our perceptions of cases such as Argentina and Chile are altered when a 
territorial dimension are weighed in. Argentina has less successful performance when it comes to 
democracy, and Chile’s health care reform, which is widely considered to be an example of 
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advanced universalism, did not address territorial inequality. The findings, as we suggest in the 
previous sections, also invite scholars to theorize about territorial variation can affect national level 
outcomes. 
We would like to finish by stating that our proposed Adjusted Measures of Democracy and 
Welfare Universalism involve trade-offs, and the choices that we have made have implications for 
perceptions of country performance. We believe these choices make good theoretical and 
conceptual sense, but we recognize that a different approach might alter the outcome. One of the 
key trade-offs is that our Gini Coefficient of territorial inequality does not weigh each country’s 
subnational unit for its relative population size. Instead, we count each unit equally, regardless of 
the number of residents that live in the region/province/department. This is true for the measure of 
democracy and immunization coverage. This influences our perception of inequality in ways that 
critics could consider misleading. It is possible that undemocratic regimes and segmented 
healthcare systems may emerge in sparsely populated regions/provinces/departments. If this is the 
case, then a majority of a country’s inhabitants may not be affected by these regimes, nor by low-
quality healthcare provision. As a result, some may argue that our system for adjusting the national 
indicator produces a skewed understanding of country-level performance. We, however, contend 
that this is appropriate for the study of democracy and universalism. Both of these concepts involve 
an idea of equal (political and social) rights among citizens. To say that some residents’ rights are 
less relevant for understanding national-level performance than others (simply because they live 
in a sparsely populated region) skews our understanding of the underlying concept. We, therefore, 
contend that this approach to adjusting national-level indicators is appropriate. 
A final consideration about our approach for adjusting national measures of democracy 
and healthcare universalism relates to the fact that a country’s performance can only be adjusted 
downward. Put differently, in a setting of perfect territorial equality, a country’s national-level 
measure of democracy and healthcare universalism remains unchanged rather than improving. We 
contend that this, too, is appropriate since perfect territorial equality suggests that the national 
aggregate measure is representative of the lived experience of residents in different portions of the 
territory. Thus, we do not believe that a given country should be considered more universal or 
more democratic in the absence of territorial inequality, but rather that the national-level indicator 
should be seen as representative, remaining unchanged by the adjustment.  
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The findings presented in this article suggest that scholars should continue to refine 
national-level measures so that they reflect subnational dispersion and territorial differences. 
Improved cross-temporal and cross-national measures would permit a more thorough investigation 
of whether or not existing theories of the welfare state and democracy effectively explain cross-
national and cross-temporal variation, once we adjust for subnational inequality. It might also 
allow new innovations in related fields, such as the study of state capacity. All of this would 
advance our theoretical and empirical understanding of two key concepts in comparative politics 
– democracy and the welfare state – and it would link scholars of subnational and cross-national 
politics in a shared discussion.  
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Figure 1: National Level Measure of Electoral Democracy 
 
Source: V-Dem Project. 
 
Figure 2: Territorial Gini Index of Subnational Undemocratic Regimes 
 
Source: Giraudy (2015), authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 3: Adjusted vs. National Level Measure of Electoral Democracy (Argentina) 
 
Source: V-Dem Project; Giraudy (2015), authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 4: Adjusted vs. National Level Measure of Electoral Democracy (Mexico) 
 
Source: V-Dem Project; Giraudy (2015), authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Adjusted Measure of Electoral Democracy (Mexico and Argentina) 
 
Source: Giraudy (2015), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Table 1: National MMR Coverage, Gini Coefficient of Territorial Inequality and Adjusted 
Measure of Healthcare Universalism in Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay (2012) 
Country National Coverage Gini Coefficient of 
Territorial Inequality 
Adjusted Measure of 
Healthcare Universalism 
Argentina 93.6 .044 89.48 
Chile 90.6 .057 85.44 
Mexico 88.67 .076 81.93 
Peru 92.9 .097 83.89 
Source: Ministerio de Salud Presidencia de la Nación Argentina (2017), Ministerio de Salud 
Républica de Chile (2017), Ministerio de Salud Républica de Peru (2017), and Departamento de 
Inmunizaciones CHLA-EP (2012). 
 
Table 2: Coverage of MMR Vaccine, Sweden and Finland (children born in 2012) 
 MMR Vaccine 
Sweden 97.5 
Finland 95.4 
Source: National Institute for Health and Welfare (2017) and The Public Health Agency of 
Sweden (2017)  
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Appendix 
 
Summary statics 
 
Table A1: SUR Index (Mexico 1997-2009) 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs 
Aguascalientes 1.15 0.12 1.03 1.34 13 
Baja California 0.68 0.06 0.59 0.77 13 
Baja California Sur 1.19 0.13 1.00 1.38 13 
Campeche 0.70 0.13 0.56 0.86 13 
Coahuila 0.56 0.00 0.55 0.56 11 
Colima 0.63 0.05 0.58 0.70 13 
Chiapas 1.26 0.21 1.08 1.63 13 
Chihuahua 1.21 0.04 1.18 1.29 13 
CDMX 1.39 0.13 1.30 1.57 10 
Durango 0.74 0.07 0.65 0.82 13 
Guanajuato 0.63 0.08 0.53 0.73 13 
Guerrero 1.10 0.14 1.00 1.33 13 
Hidalgo 0.58 0.06 0.51 0.63 13 
Jalisco 0.66 0.09 0.57 0.80 13 
Edo Mexico 0.78 0.19 0.60 1.06 13 
Michoacán 1.36 0.21 1.07 1.62 13 
Morelos 1.28 0.20 1.07 1.63 13 
Nayarit 1.18 0.12 1.06 1.32 13 
Nvo León 1.21 0.04 1.18 1.26 13 
Oaxaca 0.53 0.03 0.50 0.56 13 
Puebla 0.55 0.02 0.53 0.59 12 
Querétaro 1.29 0.09 1.15 1.39 13 
Quintana Roo 0.73 0.28 0.50 1.19 13 
San Luis Potosí 1.24 0.09 1.15 1.36 13 
Sinaloa 0.60 0.04 0.56 0.65 13 
Sonora 1.17 0.18 1.00 1.40 13 
Tabasco 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.50 13 
Tamaulipas 0.62 0.03 0.59 0.66 12 
Tlaxcala 1.17 0.19 1.00 1.38 13 
Veracruz 0.65 0.06 0.52 0.74 13 
Yucatán 1.05 0.03 1.02 1.11 13 
Zacatecas 1.42 0.15 1.02 1.58 13 
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Table A2: SUR Index (Argetina 1989-2009) 
 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Obs 
Buenos Aires 0.71 0.06 0.62 0.83 21 
CABA 0.83 0.09 0.73 1.00 13 
Catamarca 0.74 0.14 0.65 1.13 19 
Chaco 1.23 0.09 1.10 1.39 21 
Chubut 1.17 0.05 1.06 1.23 21 
Córdoba 0.86 0.49 0.20 1.38 21 
Corrientes 0.95 0.22 0.72 1.47 21 
Entre Ríos 0.98 0.26 0.70 1.23 21 
Formosa 0.28 0.31 0.03 0.75 19 
Jujuy 0.72 0.06 0.64 0.82 21 
La Pampa 0.40 0.26 0.16 0.71 21 
La Rioja 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.51 18 
Mendoza 1.03 0.32 0.69 1.40 18 
Misiones 0.80 0.21 0.67 1.31 21 
Neuquén  0.72 0.07 0.64 0.81 21 
Río Negro 0.74 0.05 0.69 0.82 21 
Salta 0.41 0.43 0.06 1.27 17 
San Juan 1.26 0.16 1.04 1.51 21 
San Luis 0.29 0.18 0.07 0.53 19 
Santa Cruz 0.30 0.24 0.10 0.69 21 
Santa Fe 0.70 0.02 0.66 0.74 21 
Santiago del 
Estero 0.79 0.25 0.57 1.25 18 
Tierra del Fuego 1.38 0.13 1.22 1.55 15 
Tucumán 0.83 0.25 0.55 1.29 21 
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Table A3: MMR Vaccination Coverage Rates in Argentina’s Provinces (2012) 
Province Coverage 
Buenos Aires 88.71 
CABA 82.84 
Catamarca 86.61 
Chaco 99.94 
Chubut 90.86 
Cordoba 102.96 
Corrientes 92.82 
Entre Rios 92.18 
Formosa 92.34 
Jujuy 100.23 
Lapampa 97.95 
La Rioja 81.07 
Mendoza 91.48 
Misiones 95.03 
Neuquen 96.25 
Rio Negro 99.07 
Salta 102.47 
San Juan 95.25 
San Luis 98.83 
Santa Cruz 113.9 
Santa Fe 85.81 
Santiago de Estero 93.04 
Tierra del Fuego 104.79 
Tucuman 103.22 
 
Table A4: MMR Coverage in Chile’s Regions (2012) 
Region Coverage 
Arica 125.9 
Tarapacá 90.5 
Antofagasta 81.4 
Atacama 97.1 
Coquimbo 90.8 
Valparaiso 93.8 
Metropolitan Region 90.4 
O’Higgins 91.5 
Maule 93.2 
Bío Bío 93.4 
Araucania 87 
Los Rios 83.7 
Los Lagos 79.4 
Aisén 75.9 
Magallanes 87.5 
 
 
 
28 
 
Table A5: MMR Coverage in Mexico’s States (2012) 
State Coverage 
Aguascalientes 92.61 
Baja California 73.51 
Baja California Sur 96.95 
Campeche 98.41 
Coahuila 88.97 
Colima 92.94 
Chiapas 107.8 
Chihuahua 79.68 
DF 103.94 
Durango 95.45 
Guanajuato 104.58 
Guerrero 66.63 
Hidalgo 76.46 
Jalisco 83.86 
México 82.25 
Michoacán 97.88 
Morelos 95.98 
Nayarit 87.75 
Nuevo León 97.11 
Oaxaca 71.47 
Puebla 92.77 
Querétaro 98.65 
Quintana Roo 86.16 
San Luis Potosí 101.64 
Sinaloa 86.25 
Sonora 77.18 
Tabasco 116.52 
Tamaulipas 88.97 
Tlaxcala 96.12 
Veracruz 68.86 
Yucatán 75.37 
Zacatecas 106.4 
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Table A6: MMR Coverage in Peru’s Departamentos (2012) 
Departamento Coverage 
Amazonas 98.6 
Áncash 91.3 
Apurimac 78.7 
Arequipa 100.1 
Ayacucho 75.5 
Cajamarca 81.4 
Callao 119.6 
Cusco 83.3 
Huancavelica 55.5 
Huánuco 76.2 
Ica 105 
Junín 79.6 
La Libertad 97.4 
Lamayeque 95.5 
Lima 96.6 
Loreto 106.7 
Madre de Dios 120.2 
Moquegua 93.4 
Pasco 93.9 
Piura 102.1 
Puno 71.7 
San Martin 110.1 
Tacna 85.1 
Tumbes 113 
Ucayali 121 
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